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RESEARCH ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX REFORM 
David Glover, EEPSEA 
INTRODUCTION 
If EEPSEA's long range goal can be described in a few words, it would be to 
answer two questions: "What would a sustainable economy look like?" and "How do 
we get there from here?". Answers to these questions must be based on answers 
to smaller ones. 
In many OECD countries, up to half of all capital generated passes through the 
tax system. It is also increasingly recognized that the effects of the tax system on 
efficiency, growth, savings, investment and employment are much greater than 
previously realized (Whalley, 1994). Developing countries are also going through 
significant changes in thinking about taxation as a result of structural adjustment and 
trade liberalization, which have reduced traditional sources of tax revenue. 
Environmental considerations, particularly concern over the effects of various 
subsidies and the debate on trade and environment have focused even more 
attention on the tax system. Logically, one of the questions we need to answer is 
"What kind of a tax system would a sustainable economy have?". 
This paper sketches out some of the research issues involved in analyzing 
environmental tax reform (ETR). It is a very informal paper, which takes the form of 
a table and several pages of explanatory notes. Its purpose is to provoke discussion 
about researchable issues that might be addressed by EEPSEA-supported 
researchers in SE Asia. The paper presupposes some familiarity with the literature 
on ETR, particularly the monographs by Repetto et al (1992) and OECD (1993). 
Those studies deal with OECD countries, however. Developing countries have 
received little attention although their pre- and post-ETR tax systems are likely to be 
very different from those of OECD countries. The capability to design and enforce 
alternative tax systems is likely to be different as well. The danger of extrapolating 
from studies in OECD countries is great and the justification for research in 
developing country contexts quite strong. 
ETR connotes a comprehensive approach to the application of environmental 
taxes and economic instruments and their combination with conventional taxes and 
other sources of public revenue. The intention is a revamping of the entire tax 
system, rather than the ad hoc addition of new taxes to the existing system. This is 
quite different from the analysis of individual economic instruments or taxes. So far 
the latter approach has been more common. 
Research on environmental taxes appears to face one of two shortcomings. 
Research on individual economic instruments is undoubtedly useful but it is not 
particularly novel. Research on ETR is novel but could be extremely demanding. 
6. 
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Research projects of considerable size, duration and complexity might be required. 
This paper proposes a framework within which partial research could be situated. 
The framework takes the form of a table or matrix, in which various kinds of analysis 
are applied to different revenue sources. (The table is presented and then annotated 
on the following pages.) If research resources were unlimited, we would fill in every 
cell of the matrix with real data to provide a comprehensive analysis. This is clearly 
impossible. 
Two second-best approaches for any research project would be: a) to fill in 
only a few cells with real data through empirical work; b) to fill in more cells with 
hypothetical data through modelling. The table is annotated below. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL TAX REFORM: 
SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE AND RESEARCH ISSUES 
Revenue Sources 
Public utility Conventional taxes Eco-taxes 
tariffs & quasi-taxes 
Research Issues 
1. Description of Current System 
- list of taxes & their weights 
2. Environmental Aspects 
a) identify env. impacts 
b) quantify env. impacts 
c) set appropriate tax level 
d) firm/industry responses 
i) technical change 
ii) structural change 
e) iteration between c & d 
3. Fiscal Aspects 
a) robustness of revenue 
b) stability of revenue 
c) resistance to inflation 
d) pros & cons of earmarking 
e) administrative feasibility 
4. Economic Aspects 
a) effects on competitiveness 
& employment 
b) incidence (Y distribution) 
i) costs 
ii) benefits 
c) political feasibility 
(based on a & b) 
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REVENUE SOURCES 
Any discussion of this topic immediately faces problems of definition: What is 
an environmental tax? What is a tax per se for that matter? A comprehensive view 
of the sources of public revenue and their implications for the environment would 
ideally cover three kinds of revenue sources. (The table lists these along the 
horizontal axis.) 
a) Public utility tariffs. Charges by public enterprises for water, electricity and 
other services are potentially a source of considerable revenue. While many such 
enterprises currently lose money because of underpricing, MOC pricing (in the 
common case where MC > AC) could result in financial surpluses. 
b) Conventional taxes and quasi-taxes. These include personal and corporate 
income taxes, VAT, import duties and export taxes, and other measures. Developing 
countries often rely heavily on "quasi-taxes" like betterment levies and surpluses (if 
any) from public enterprises. 
c) Eco-taxes. These include energy taxes, resource rent taxes, taxes on 
environmentally harmful inputs, emissions charges, and others. 
Most governments derive revenue from all three of these sources, including c). 
But the range of eco-taxes in use and the level at which they are applied generally 
fall sort of their potential. For example, the level at which most eco-taxes are applied 
is sufficient to provide some earmarked revenue for environmental programs, but not 
high enough to cause changes in behaviour. ETR significantly increases the number 
and/or level of eco-taxes. The additional revenue might be used for environmental 
investments; to reduce government deficits; or to compensate for a reduction in 
conventional taxes (a "revenue neutral" approach). 
EEPSEA-supported research on ETR would concentrate on revenue sources 
a) and c). Limited attention might be paid to b), mainly through secondary literature. 
Source a) is being explored through EEPSEA research on MOC pricing of water and 
other resources. Issues in MOC pricing are not raised here because they are 
discussed elsewhere (J. Warford, 1994). 
RESEARCH ISSUES 
In an ideal world, each of these steps would be followed for all current and 
potential taxes. All cells in the matrix would eventually be filled. In the real world, 
researchers might investigate as few as one cell of the matrix in a first phase and 
extend the analysis horizontally or vertically in subsequent phases. These steps can 
be carried out for a single tax, a set of taxes, or set of substitutes (e.g. what happens 
if we reduces income taxes and increase energy taxes?). 
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1. Description of Current System 
Existing literature should provide a list of the current sources of government 
revenue and the percentages of total revenue derived from each. Some idea of how 
these percentages have changed in the last 15 years would also be useful, along with 
an indication of any problems or likely future trends, ceteris paribus (E.g. Is there 
external pressure to move toward a VAT? Are enforcement costs becoming 
prohibitive for some taxes? Is trade liberalization reducing revenue from trade 
taxes?) 
2. Environmental Aspects 
a) Identify environmental impacts of current taxes 
Conventional taxes. It may be that conventional taxes contain perverse 
incentives and that lowering those taxes would create environmental benefits. For 
example, it is conceivable that investments in environmentally friendly technologies 
are discouraged. Such examples are not immediately obvious, however. Corporate 
income tax may discourage investment in general, but there is no obvious prime face 
case that it is a greater disincentive for environmental investments. Arguments in the 
ETR literature (Repetto) for lowering conventional taxes stem not from any 
environmental impact of current levels, but from deleterious effects on savings, 
investment and employment. 
The more obvious effects comes through tax expenditures and subsidies. (Tax 
expenditures are tax breaks: reductions in taxes to below normal levels, even to zero. 
Subsidies involve transfers from government to firms or households.) These are 
areas in which conventional taxes (broadly defined) probably need to be raised, to 
levels that are at least greater than zero. Here the literature is fairly abundant. Here 
again, problems of definition and scope appear. Subsidies clearly have important 
revenue and environmental implications, but including them in the research 
framework broadens the scope considerably. Many are also included in public utility 
tariffs. 
Ecotaxes. Current levels are low or nonexistent and it is assumed that they 
need to be raised. Unlike the case of conventional taxes, this research is mainly 
hypothetical: what would the effects of tax changes be? (See 2c.) 
b) Quantify current environmental damage 
Various valuation methods are available to quantify the damages caused by 
current practices. Each method has its pros, cons and practical limitations. In 
general, the method chosen should be compatible with the purpose of the tax. For 
example, if the purpose of the tax is to reduce pollution by inducing changes in 
production practices (rather than to finance end-of-pipe clean up programs) then it 
would not be appropriate to use cost of cleanup as proxy for environmental damage. 
(Even if the eco-tax is a user charge levied to cover the cost of a joint waste 
treatment facility, using cost of cleanup would have to be done with care. That cost 
will depend on the standard to be achieved; ideally that standard should be the 
outcome of a cost-benefit analysis, not an input into the analysis.) 
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c) Set appropriate tax levels 
This is the most critical step in the design of an eco-tax. In principle, it should 
be set at a level such that the value of the damage avoided is equal to the cost 
incurred in avoiding it (i.e. drawing on cost-benefit analysis). This would require 
knowledge of the likely response of firms to pollution taxes: e.g. how much reduction 
in pollution is likely to result from a given emissions charge? In the absence of such 
knowledge, the government might begin with a fairly low tax level and gradually 
increase it according to a pre-announced schedule, until the appropriate level is 
reached. 
Further adjustments may be needed over time as responses to initial tax levels 
become clearer. Also, strong economic growth may overwhelm reductions in pollution 
intensity, especially where pollution results from the production of goods for which 
demand is highly income-elastic. New information may call for the reassessment of 
the severity or value of environmental damages, and so on. 
d) Firm/industry responses 
Firms have two basic choices in responding to an eco-tax: to change their 
production technology or to leave the industry. Factors affecting this choice include: 
the speed with which the tax is introduced (suddenly, or gradually increasing over 
time); vintage of the capital stock; longevity of capital stock; rate of growth in the 
industry; cost of capital; availability of new technology, influenced in part by import 
barriers; and other factors. 
Taxes at levels that encourage some technical change may be acceptable to 
industry and the general public. There may be cases, however, where the optimal 
tax will actually lead not only to the exit of firms from an industry but to the 
disappearance of an industry itself and (one hopes) the employment of those 
resources in an alternative use. This eventuality is much less accepted but may be 
necessary if real progress is to be toward sustainable development. It may not be 
possible to predict which effect an eco-tax will have, since the feasible rate of 
technical change is not easy to predict, but such information is clearly important. 
3. Fiscal Aspects 
To be attractive to policy makers, eco-taxes must not only deliver 
environmental benefits but also be financially viable. This aspect is somewhat less 
researched and provides opportunities for public finance economists who do not have 
extensive knowledge of the environmental literature. Since the literature on fiscal 
aspects of conventional taxes is abundant, EEPSEA need not add to it. We could, 
however, draw on the methods and findings of such literature in studies of eco-taxes. 
a) Robustness of revenue 
Eco-taxes, like other taxes on "bads" (e.g. alcohol and tobacco) have a 
peculiar feature: their success in discouraging the undesired behaviour will reduce the 
tax base (to zero if completely effective.) To maintain revenue, the tax rate must be 
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continually increased. How feasible is this? Can automatic and/or market-based 
mechanisms be incorporated to avoid the need to continually revise rates, as 
Singapore has done by auctioning automobile permits? 
b) Tax elasticity / stability of revenue 
Taxes vary in the degree to which changes in the tax base affect revenue (e.g. 
resulting from fluctuations in the business cycle). 
c) Resistance to inflation 
Both the revenue generated and incentive effects of a tax can be eroded by 
inflation. (e.g. if the charge for one unit of emissions remains constant in nominal 
terms but declines in real terms). Indexing of emissions charges to inflation rates has 
its pros and cons. On the other hand, progressive personal income taxes produce 
more real revenue under high inflation because taxpayers move into higher tax 
brackets as their nominal incomes increase. While few Asian countries face the 
hyperinflation for which Latin America is famous, the degree to which eco-taxes are 
susceptible to erosion by inflation could be relevant in some countries. 
d) Earmarking 
Directing the revenue from a specific tax to a specific purpose is common in 
eco-taxes and often increases the political acceptability of a new tax. However, the 
prevailing opinion in public finance circles seems to be that earmarking is neither 
effective nor efficient. 
A related question is which agency collects the revenue, which spends it, and 
which bears the costs of collection and enforcement. While earmarking may not be 
optimal, tax collection is unlikely to be effective if an underfunded agency bears the 
cost of tax collection but receives none of the receipts. On the other hand, there was 
considerable controversy when in June 1994, Cambodia decided that revenue from 
stumpage fees would be collected by and accrue to the Ministry of Defence, rather 
than the central government budget, as had been the case previously. 
e) Administrative feasibility 
Some taxes which are desirable in theory can be prohibitively difficult or 
expensive to administer. (Bangladesh is said to have a VAT, 70% of whose revenues 
are consumed by collection costs.) The administrative feasibility of an eco-tax will be 
affected by many factors: the data and skills need to design the tax; the amount of 
information (e.g. on emissions) needed to administer the tax; susceptibility to evasion; 
number of tax payments to be made and accounted for and so on. Costs to the 
taxpayer should also be considered. 
4. Economic Aspects 
One of the strongest arguments for ETR is that it provides a "double dividend": 
The introduction of new eco-taxes reduces environmental damage while the reduction 
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of conventional taxes reduces disincentives to saving, investment and work. The 
combined result should be both economic and environmental benefits. Some work 
has been done to measure the welfare gains from reducing conventional taxes in 
revenue-neutral ETRs for OECD countries. It would be useful to do it as well for 
developing countries, where current systems of conventional taxes are quite different. 
In addition, some of the economic/welfare impacts of eco-taxes could be 
investigated. Two topics are suggested below. 
a) Effects on competitiveness and employment 
It follows from the above that some firms will find it more difficult to compete, 
especially internationally, after an eco-tax has been imposed. Some firms may go 
out of business, causing an immediate employment loss. However, the nature of the 
technical change itself could, in theory, be employment creating, offsetting this loss. 
(For example, there seems to be considerable scope for substituting labour for energy 
in developing countries.) 
General equilibrium effects could also be important. As relative prices change, 
there will be incentives to expand less environmentally damaging industries. The 
amount of employment generated by the shrinking and expanding industries may 
differ and there are reasons to believe that many environmentally friendly industries 
will be more labour intensive than those they replace. 
Finally, the effects of a full blown tax reform - one which reduces some 
conventional taxes - needs to be factored in. Studies for OECD countries show a 
large potential for employment expansion resulting from reduction of payroll taxes. 
b) Incidence (income distribution) 
The incidence of an individual tax or a new tax system is of great social and 
political interest. The incidence of both benefits and costs needs to be assessed. 
An eco-tax should result in an environmental improvement, the beneficiaries 
of which can be identified. Frequently, but not always, they will be the poor, who lack 
the means to shield themselves from generalized environmental hazards by buying 
bottled water or air conditioners. This needs to be verified, however, not only 
asserted. Furthermore, short run and long run beneficiaries may be different. 
Sewerage, garbage disposal and clean water could make a squatter settlement an 
attractive area to live and result in evictions. 
A method for assessing the incidence of costs has been suggested by Besley 
and Kanbur (1988). While it is common to estimate the percentage of a family's 
income allocated to the good whose price is increased, they propose a different 
measure: the proportion of total consumption of a good consumed by the poor. 
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CONCLUSION 
This research agenda includes but goes beyond environmental economics. 
Examining the fiscal aspects of eco-taxes, for example, is straightforward public 
finance economics. EEPSEA's mandate is not restricted to environmental economics, 
however. It aims to understand the effects of environmental policies on the economy 
as well as the effect of economic policies on the environment. Research on ETR 
has 
elements of both. 
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